been in greater action than in others, and where the number of peculiar organic 
beings have consequently become more considerable’ (58). Lyell did not intend to 
‘call in question’ the theory of centres of dispersion of species. What he 
objected to was the inference that ‘a greater exertion of creative power’ had 
taken place at those locations.
 

It was, however, necessary to avoid the opposite danger of identifying his 
theory with the catastrophist interpretation of Cuvier's theory of 
‘revolutions’. According to Cuvier, great revolutions had succeeded each other 
throughout the ages, and have caused the disappearance of the fauna and flora 
living at each period in the localities affected by each ‘bouleversement’. 
Although Cuvier did not adopt an extreme formulation of the catastrophist model, 
numerous popularizations, and even works by certain geologists, proposed that 
after any ‘catastrophe’ an extraordinary exertion of God's creative power 
restored life upon the earth (59). Lyell attacked the catastrophist and 
creationist overtones in the popularizations of Cuvier's theories, commenting on 
the solution proposed to the problem of disappearance of species by the famous 
Italian geologist and naturalist, Giovan Battista Brocchi. Brocchi had made 
clear his dislike for any extraordinary exertion of supernatural agents. He 
maintained that each species had probably been endowed with a certain determined 
span of life, and that species, like individuals, died as if affected by old age 
(60). Grant himself took note of Brocchi's theory. In the paper in the Edinburgh 
new philosophical journal already mentioned, he dwelt briefly upon the problem 
of extinction, and referred to Brocchi's theory as a hypothesis worthy of 
consideration, though he of course preferred Lamarck's solution (61).
 

From his own point of view, Lyell believed that Brocchi's theory was another 
result of incorrect methodology in the natural sciences. Extinction was clearly 
demonstrated by the geological remains. Some authors developed a theory based on 
imagined catastrophes ; others, like Brocchi, attempted a different solution, 
but lacked a correct methodology of research. Lyell set out to prove that his 
own form of uniformitarianism was methodologically sound, and would lead the 
naturalist towards a correct solution of the problem. Lyell proposed to approach 
the question of extinction according to the method described in the first volume 
of the Principles. The naturalist should ascertain what causes were currently in 
operation on the surface of the earth, determine what power of modification they 
had, and what consequences were deducible from their co-ordinated action. The 
naturalist ‘must examine attentively the circumstances, which determine the 
stations of particular animals and plants’ and all the processes which can 
modify the station themselves, from both the physical and the organic point of 
view. A detailed and documented survey of the ‘balance of nature’ argument, and 
of the ecological mechanisms which alter and restore the equilibrium in animal 
and vegetable populations, led to the conclusion that ‘the successive 
destruction of 

(58) C. Lyell, Principles, ii, 126.

(59) On the question of Cuvier's ‘catastrophism’, and its various 
interpretations, see : E. S. Russell, op. cit. (49) ; M. J. S. Rudwick, The 
meaning of fossils, London, 1972, 134-5, and passim ; W. Coleman, George Cuvier, 
zoologist. A study in the history of evolution theory, Cambridge, Mass., 1964, 
passim ; cf. also F. Bourdier, ‘Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire vs. Cuvier’, in Cecil J. 
Scheer, ed., op. cit. (4), pp. 39-61 ; see in particular pp. 43-4. For an early 
recognition of the misrepresentation of Cuvier's ideas in England, see R. Knox, 
Great artists and great anatomists : a biographical and philosophical study, 
London, 1852 pp. 26-9, 42-5.
 

(60) G. B. Brocchi, Conchologia fossile subapennina, con osservazioni geologiche 
sugli Appennini e sul suolo adiacente, Milano, 1814, pp. 227-9.
 

(61) R. E. Grant, op. cit. (II), p. 298.